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Patrick C. Trettenbrein
It is not an overstatement to consider Eric Lenneberg the founder of the field of biol-
ogy of language and his Biological Foundations of Language one the field’s founding
documents. Similarly, modern linguistics in the tradition of generative grammar
was founded by Noam Chomsky in the 1950s with his Syntactic Structures as one of
the founding documents of this field.
Figure 1: Noam Chomsky portrayed
by Jean-Baptiste Labrune (Creative
Commons BY-SA 4.0).
At first, the work of Chomsky and Lenne-
berg as well as their respective seminal books
may seem only vaguely related—after all, Bio-
logical Foundations of Language surveyed the bio-
logical literature while Syntactic Structures pro-
vided a formal analysis of natural language
syntax. However, nothing could be further
from the truth: Lenneberg and Chomsky co-
founded what today is known as biolinguistics
during their time as graduate students at Har-
vard. Even a quick look at Biological Founda-
tions of Language gives this away: Chomsky con-
tributed an appendix on “The formal nature of
language” to the book. A closer look reveals
that Lenneberg himself heavily relied on formal
analysis (of language) just like that provided by
Chomsky in order to advance his argument (in
this context, see Piattelli-Palmarini, this issue,
Becker, this issue).
Consequently, talking to Noam Chomsky as a co-founder of the field, con-
temporary, and friend of Eric Lenneberg was the obvious thing to do. Luckily,
Professor Chomsky took the time to answer some questions about the early days of
the field, his work and relation with Lenneberg, and a number of other questions
and scientific issues that (still) captivate us 50 years later.
In this document, all questions posed by the interviewer (Patrick C. Trettenbrein) are printed
in italics, whereas Professor Chomsky’s answers are printed in normal type. Please note that
this interview also includes some questions originally raised by colleagues and friends, which
the interviewer has tried to reproduce here as accurately as possible. References to books and
articles mentioned have been added for the readers’ convenience.
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First of all, let me thank you for taking the time to answer my questions. As you know, the
reason for this interview is the 50th anniversary of the publication of Eric Lenneberg’s mon-
umental Biological Foundations of Language (1967), now widely considered one of the
founding documents of the field besides, for example, your Syntactic Structures (Chom-
sky 1957/2002). I would like to start out by asking you about your relationship with Eric
Lenneberg in the early days of biolinguistics. I take it the two of you first met during your
time at Harvard?
I arrived at Harvard in 1951. Eric did at about the same time. We met very soon
and quickly became close friends, the families too.
How closely were you working with Eric Lenneberg in those early days (and also later)?
When re-reading Biological Foundations of Language at the end of last year it struck
me how surprisingly modern many of his points of view were despite limited data he could
draw from. Similarly, I was struck by how closely many arguments he puts forward align
with what I would assume to be your points of view. Consider, for example, some of the
points discussed by Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini (this issue): Lenneberg’s take on language
development, his considerations on a possible genetics of language, or on a more conceptual
level, the distinction between competence and performance; even his ideas about the evolu-
tion of language. How big would you consider his influence on your thinking about these
issues (and beyond)?
We spent a great deal of time together in the early 1950s, along with our mutual
friend Morris Halle, discussing common interests, work we were doing, problems
we were thinking about, papers and books we were studying, and the state of the
fields in the areas of our interest. And lots more. What drew us together in this con-
nection was a shared scepticism about much of what was virtual orthodoxy at the
time in Cambridge: radical behaviourism and behavioural science more generally
in the forms it was taking, the reigning doctrines of structural linguistics, euphoria
about the prospects for new technologies, and a prevailing attitude, which seemed
to us misguided, that these alleged breakthroughs would soon revolutionize the
study of human thought and behaviour, casting out traditional mentalist mysti-
cism.
Eric was beginning his investigation of biology of language in those years,
but the insights you describe here—and there are many—are mostly from work of
his years later. By the mid-1950s Eric and I left Harvard. He went to medical school,
I went to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). We remained in contact
but not with the intensity of the early ’50s when we were grad students at Harvard,
meeting regularly.
Despite the enormous overlap between your points of view, as far as I could find out, the
two of you never ended up publishing a joint paper—though you of course wrote an ap-
pendix to Biological Foundations of Language. In many respects, your work and that of
Eric Lenneberg seem complimentary insofar as you focused on many conceptual issues and
adopted a more computational respectively theoretical approach whereas he delved deeply
into biology. How come the two of you never ended up publishing a joint paper?
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During the years when we were in close contact we were graduate students. For
some years afterward, publication possibilities altogether were limited for the kind
of work in which we were engaged, which was quite isolated. And by the time
publishing opportunities opened up we were pursuing somewhat separate if re-
lated paths.
More generally, could you elaborate a little bit on the early days? What led you and
Lenneberg to pursue these questions, that is, what led you to look at language from a bio-
logical point of view?
To the three of us—Eric, Morris, and me—it simply seemed obvious that the hu-
man language faculty is part of human biology, much like the visual and other fac-
ulties. If so, it only made sense to try to incorporate the study of language within a
general biological framework, the path that Eric pursued in his own way with such
intensity and success.
With regard to Eric Lenneberg the person, do you remember what fostered his specific inter-
est in language or where it came from? And do you any idea what made him go to medical
school after already having earned his PhD in linguistics and psychology?
When we met, in 1951, we each had a special interest in language and psychol-
ogy. After Eric finished his studies in linguistics–psychology, given his particular
concern with biological foundations, it was quite natural for him to move on to
med school.
This may be a somewhat odd question, because you of course wrote a chapter on the for-
mal nature of language that was included as an appendix in Biological Foundations of
Language, meaning that you obviously endorsed the book and what Lenneberg had to say
about language and biology. Still, I would like to know what your overall impression of the
book was when it first came out, respectively when you first got to read the manuscript?
I thought it was an instant classic, basically founding a new discipline. It is sur-
prising, in fact shocking, that it is not better known. Just to mention one example,
there has been an enormous growth of interest in evolution of language from the
90s—many publications, conferences, societies – but it’s quite rare to find a refer-
ence to Eric’s discussion of the topic in his classic book, though it was pathbreaking
at the time and remains today one of the most sophisticated and advanced contri-
butions to the topic.
Okay. Now, looking back 50 years later, what would you consider to be the book’s biggest
achievement? Why do you think it is still relevant, respectively, why should researchers
and students today still bother reading it?
The book developed a sound, deeply informed, comprehensive, carefully executed
biological basis for the study of the human language faculty, its use and its evolu-
tion, not only bringing together what was known about this topic but substantially
extending it, including provocative speculations that were far from conventional at
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the time but have since in many cases been shown to have been on the right track.
And while a great deal has been learned since, this study remains an indispensable
source for inquiry into the biology of language in all of its aspects.
Yes, it is very impressive how modern Lenneberg’s view of language development and the
biological theory of language he sketches at the end of the book in a summarising chap-
ter already were, despite the fact that a lot of the important empirical work on acquisition
from which we can draw today had not yet been carried out. While some modifications and
updates may be required here and there his theory is still very accurate. In earlier work
(Lenneberg 1964) he already indicated that his long-term goal was to do exactly this: come
up with a biological theory of language.
Still, it is interesting to note that Biological Foundations of Language in many
ways was kind of a late comer to the party: Your review of Verbal Behavior (Chomsky
1959) had already had a huge effect on linguistics and psychology and some reviewers of
Lenneberg’s book at the time noted that, in a way, it seems that he not only sought to sketch
a biological theory of language but also wanted to
[. . . ] provide a palpable biological plausibility for conclusions to which a num-
ber of uncomfortable Empiricists [. . . ] [had] committed themselves on the basis
of formal argument alone. (Bem & Bem 1968: 498–499)
Do you agree?
When we arrived at Harvard, Skinner’s William James lectures of 1948, the essence
of his book Verbal Behavior, were widely regarded as the definitive approach to the
psychology of language, in part because of the adoption of the basic framework
by the highly influential Harvard philosopher W.V.O. Quine. Our triumvirate was
almost alone in regarding it as seriously misguided.
My review, to which you refer, was submitted for publication in 1957, when
Eric was already in medical school, but we had discussed these matters extensively
in earlier years. The review drew from our reading and discussion of ethologi-
cal literature, which was remote from the reigning orthodoxy. The rigidity of the
orthodoxy is illustrated by the fact that even Karl Lashley’s important 1951 pa-
per on serial order in behaviour, which pretty much undermined Skinnerian be-
haviourism, was apparently unknown in the Cambridge behavioural science com-
munity. I couldn’t find a reference in the relevant literature when I brought it up in
the review (and I learned about it from an art historian, Meyer Schapiro). But these
were the kinds of topics we were discussing. Eric’s exploration of biological foun-
dations was already underway at the time, though fully developed and published
only a few years later.
So, you started out in Harvard by reading the European ethological literature in the orig-
inal German—because Lenneberg grew up in Germany. Of course, you pointed out that
language is actually best studied within an ethological framework and there are some obvi-
ous points about language that can be made which are still not being universally acknowl-
edged. For example, the very straightforward and obvious idea that your language is a
property of you and, first and foremost, your brain is still—maybe somewhat implicitly—
deemed controversial when there are cognitive scientists who say that languages evolve(d)
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in order to fit human brains (e.g., Christiansen & Mu¨ller 2015), whatever that is supposed
to mean. What is your take on the current state of the biolinguistic research program today?
True: “whatever that is supposed to mean.” And yes, in the early ’50s, Morris, Eric
and I were reading ethological literature. They were both fluent in German and
read originals. I kept mostly to the English language literature. This was foreign
territory in the Cambridge intellectual community of which we were part, and to
the extent that it was known at all, it was dismissed. The idea that there could be
an instinctive element in human language, or cognitive capacities generally, which
seemed to us virtual truism, was regarded by the most influential figures as virtual
nonsense. So it was a private preoccupation. Almost. George Miller was recep-
tive to what we were thinking about, along with several fellow students. But few
others.
In the years since, and currently, biolinguistics has been flourishing, thanks
to much deeper understanding of the nature of language, its acquisition and use,
but also in part to new imaging technology that has in some measure overcome the
ethical constraints on direct experimentation—and unlike the study of vision and
other capacities, experiments with other animals tell us very little because of the
species-specificity of the basic properties of language. There are no homologous
systems to investigate.
Digressing a little bit for second, I’d like to ask a related question that concerns linguis-
tics as a field more generally. Your own and thus, by extension, Eric Lenneberg’s ideas
about the scientific study of the language faculty are sometimes still portrayed as “contro-
versial” even today—though it is interesting to see that Lenneberg is hardly ever referenced
by critics despite having advocated a very similar point of view. Why do you think that
is? One would think that it would be more attractive to attack someone who is no longer
around to defend their views?
I don’t think that’s the reason. You have to ask who the critics have been. In the
past 60 years, I’ve discussed the kind of work we (and by now a great many others)
have been doing with people and audiences in many different disciplines. It’s of-
ten been considered highly controversial (if not absurd) by philosophers, linguists,
and a variety of social scientists, but not by physicists, mathematicians, biologists,
including distinguished figures, among them Nobel laureates in evolutionary biol-
ogy, with one of whom I co-taught graduate seminars in biology of language in the
1970s.
Among the critics, Eric’s work was barely known, if at all, and if it had been
known would have been considered “real science,” not subject to this kind of cri-
tique. In the hard sciences, explanatory theories that are developed at what David
Marr (1982/2010) called the computational/representational and algorithmic levels
are considered quite natural, and analogues are familiar in the disciplines. These
are matters that have been extensively discussed. To mention one example, Jerry
Fodor has devoted much of his distinguished career to explaining the validity of
such approaches and countering criticism of them.1
1 Interviewer’s note: This exchange took place before the passing of Jerry Fodor at the end of
November 2017.
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Continuing with this topic for just a little bit longer, it seems that there are two different
ways of doing linguistics, on some level maybe analogous to the way in which biology was
done when it was still called natural history as opposed to how biological research is carried
out nowadays. Norbert Hornstein speaks of languistics as opposed to linguistics. To what
extend do you think the entire discipline is still caught up in the “cultural history” stage,
cataloguing what is found in the world, analogous to what the predecessors of biologists did
when biology was still natural history?
The answer becomes clear when one compares what was appearing in the jour-
nals in the ‘50s with what appears in the (many more) journals today. It illustrates
dramatically a change from languistics to linguistics in Hornstein’s sense. Further-
more, the typological range of languages investigated has vastly extended along
with the depth of the questions examined, most of them unimaginable not many
years ago. In this crucial sense then, “cataloguing what is found in the world” has
vastly increased both in scope and depth.
Coming back to my previous question about the relation of your work to that of Eric
Lenneberg, I would like to dwell a little more on the relationship of linguistics and biol-
ogy. While the biological approach to studying language took shape in the ’50s and ’60s of
the past century it seemingly took a while for the label “biolinguistics” to catch on and it
has been popularised only in the past decades, amongst other things with the establishment
of Biolinguistics, the journal in which this interview will be published. Recently, some
people have complained that the label biolinguistics is kind of a rebranding of generative
grammar, whereas actual biolinguistics should be understood more exclusively as a label for
all biological investigation of the language faculty (e.g., Martins & Boeckx 2016). What is
your take on this?
I don’t see much of an issue. Biological investigation of the language faculty is, by
definition, an approach to investigation of the language faculty. Generative gram-
mar is the study of core properties of the language faculty. Why should any issue
arise?
I agree. As I understood it, the criticism is about theoretical linguists mostly carrying
on with their business “as usual” while labelling their work as “biolinguistics,” despite not
actively seeking integration with biology. Boeckx & Grohmann (2007), in the inaugural
article of this journal, labelled this the two senes of biolinguistics: the “weak” and “strong”
sense; the former being that linguists still seek to uncover the properties of grammar and the
latter referring to work that requires the integration of linguistic insights with those from
other disciplines. Would you agree that this distinction should be made?
Individuals can choose their own research interests and projects. Clearly, however,
the domain of “strong” biolinguistics, as defined, can be pursued only to the extent
that “linguistic insights”—that is “properties of grammar”—have been developed
sufficiently to be combined and integrated. Same quite generally, whatever the
specific domain of inquiry: vision (as David Marr famously discussed; see Marr
1982/2010), insect communication, any other. Again, I don’t see any issues.
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When re-reading many of Eric Lenneberg’s publications as preparation for this project it
seemed to me that he probably would have agreed with the rather critical assessment that
a true integration of linguistics and biology is still missing and that generative grammar
has kind of “hijacked” the label biolinguistics. Obviously, there was a clear gap between
linguistics and biology in Lenneberg’s days and there still is today. Was he generally opti-
mistic about an eventual integration of linguistics and biology? And are you yourself still
optimistic about that, respectively do you think we are now closer to a “real biolinguistics”
than 50 years ago?
As noted, I don’t understand the “hijacking” issue. Surely a lot has been learned
about the biology of language—biolinguistics—in the past 50 years. I don’t know
what a “real biolinguistics” is any more than what a real biology of vision is. There
is increasing understanding of the topics. What more can we expect?
I admit that “hijacking” may be a bit strong of a term. Still, I actually had a quote by
Lenneberg in mind. He wrote that
nothing is gained by labeling the propensity for language as biological unless
we can use this insight for new research directions—unless more specific cor-
relates can be uncovered. (Lenneberg 1964: 76)
I suppose you would say that generative grammar offers the “new research directions” and
that’s why the issue doesn’t even arise?
When a language is understood as a biological object, as in generative grammar
(an I-language in contemporary terminology), then certain questions arise directly:
• How is language acquired?
• What is its neural basis?
• How did it evolve?
• How is it used?
Such questions cannot be formulated in any clear form if language is regarded as
some kind of community property—say, a “sort of contract” in a community (Saus-
sure) or “the totality of utterances made in a speech community” (Bloomfield). Ac-
cordingly, though not entirely neglected, such questions could be pursued only in
limited ways in terms of such conceptions.
Furthermore, as noted earlier, it is virtual truism that such questions can be
pursued seriously only to the extent that the properties of these biological objects
are understood. It is not controversial that these “new research directions” have
been developed in highly productive ways within the general “biolinguistic frame-
work” that generative grammar adopted from its origins.
Against this background, consider the following quote from a report by Eric Lenneberg
written in 1972, rescued from oblivion by Michael Arbib (cf. Arbib, this issue), a few years
after Biological Foundations of Language including your appendix had been published:
At present there is only one type of scientific theory of language structure avail-
able, generative grammar, and this was never intended to serve as a model for
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biological mechanisms. The intent was to create a formalism that would ade-
quately describe the web of relationships that characterizes a natural language
such as English. For a time it looked as if it might turn into an algorithm or lan-
guage analysis, but this is yet an unrealized dream (except for highly restricted
discourse). Generative grammar does help us here and there to define the mean-
ing of complexity in the structure of sentences, but because of the way it has
been set up , it will also classify some utterances as complex (i.e., products of a
long and complex history of transformations) that are intuitively the simplest
of all—e.g., “Water!” which would have to be accounted for as a derivative of
“Give me water!” which, in turn, is derived from a more basic form, “*You give
me water.” What is most urgently needed is a theory of sentence production
and comprehension that has the formal precision of Chomsky’s approach but is
explicitly intended to explicate the psychobiological underpinnings of language
capabilities. (Lenneberg 1972: 635–636)
Do you think that developments in generative grammar in the past decades have brought
it closer to the theory of sentence production and comprehension that Lenneberg had called
for? In many ways work within the Minimalist Program (MP) seems even further removed
from a theory of language production and processing, instead focusing on the formal nature
of the involved machinery?
I don’t entirely understand the quote. A generative grammar G of language L seeks
to determine the structure of the infinite class of expressions of L and their inter-
pretation at the conceptual-intentional (semantic-pragmatic) and sensorimotor in-
terface (the role of the former primary, so recent work suggests). It is a theory of
competence. Theories of performance for L will of course access the stored com-
petence characterized by G; and general theories of performance will, correspond-
ingly, access general properties of competence grammars. It all falls within biology,
and all has “psychobiological underpinnings”.
There has been a great deal of progress in the study of language processing,
including extensive and productive work on minimalist parsers, much of it appear-
ing in a forthcoming book on minimalist parsers edited by Robert Berwick (Berwick
& Stabler, in press). The study of language production has also progressed, though
with a huge gap that holds for all voluntary action. As described figuratively by
two leading researchers of voluntary action, Emilio Bizzi and Robert Ajemian (Bizzi
& Ajemian 2015), we are learning a good deal about the puppet and the strings, but
the role of the puppeteer remains a mystery. In the case of language, it was essen-
tially this mystery that inspired the awe and wonder of some of the great founders
of modern science, including Galileo, Descartes and the logician-linguists of Port
Royal.
Of course I agree that it all falls within biology, theories of performance as well as com-
petence. In my understanding of the quote, Lenneberg was—in part—pointing to the dis-
crepancy between linguistics and biology that we already briefly discussed. It seems that
the study of competence has isolated and still isolates linguistics from psychology and neu-
roscience; maybe even preventing a closer integration of these respective fields, as in parts
of psycholinguistics?
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Chesi & Moro (2015) have recently argued that competence and performance are ac-
tually interdependent. I would argue that there are essentially three possible scenarios in
which the relation of grammar (G) and a parser as a performance system (P) could work
out: (i) G could be independent of P, (ii) G could be accessed by P online during processing,
or (iii) it could turn out that G is only implemented in wetware insofar as the totality of P’s
mechanisms gives rise to a system behaving in a way that is captured by the description of
G. What are your thoughts about this? And how would you describe the relation of linguis-
tics to psychology and neuroscience?
I don’t understand any of this. The study of competence can’t be isolated from
psychology because it is part of psychology—unless we (perversely) define “psy-
chology” to exclude internally-stored knowledge of language, arithmetic, etc. Psy-
cholinguistics, for the past 50 years, has been closely integrated with the study of
linguistic competence. How could it be otherwise? Same with neurolinguistics.
Linguistic competence is represented in the brain (not the foot, not in outer space)
and the same is true of performances that access this stored knowledge of language.
Speaking personally, I’ve always regarded linguistics, at least the aspects that
interest me, as part of psychology, hence ultimately biology. The relation of linguis-
tics to psychology is similar to the relation of the theory of vision to psychology:
part to whole. And insofar as we are concerned with what is happening in the
brain, it’s integrated with neuroscience. In brief, I don’t see how any of these ques-
tions even arise except under delimitation of fields that seem quite arbitrary and
have never made sense to me.
Of course I agree that linguistic competence is not represented in the foot. What I was
trying to get at is that, for example, it could be the case that this internally stored knowl-
edge is only accessed during processing in the sense that it is built into the way in which
the performance system works. Does that make any sense or am I completely off the mark
here?
The I-language—linguistic competence—is accessed in every use of language: in
processing linguistic input, but also production (including internal construction of
thought). If it is “built into the way in which the performance system works,” then
it must be duplicated in each performance system, which does not seem a reason-
able proposal. I don’t see any way of reformulating this idea that does not reduce
to the assumption that I-language is a central system accessed by performance sys-
tems, much as knowledge of arithmetic is accessed in calculating.
Okay. You have recently co-authored a paper on the neural basis of language processing
with Angela Friederici (Friederici et al. 2017), so you must be somewhat optimistic that
real progress can be made in this area. What is your advice for researchers trying to bring
linguistic theory and psychology or neuroscience closer together?
Not quite. I contributed some introductory remarks to her very important book
(Friederici 2017a). On the rest, I don’t think the formulation of the questions is
helpful, any more than the question of how to advise researchers trying to bring
the theory of visual perception and psychology and neuroscience closer together.
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It doesn’t seem to me the right way to formulate the issues. There are different
approaches to the study of language (vision, etc.), and intriguing problems where
they intersect. The advice is to pursue them.
On a related note, one of the biggest successes of the MP has been to reduce the complexity
of the postulated cognitive machinery, for example, by relying only on a single operation
which we think is at the core of the language faculty, that is Merge. Now, you yourself
have speculated that it is not at all clear whether Merge is specific to language, at least
in phylogenetic terms. With regard to how an operation like Merge may be implemented
in wetware we are still in a situation where we can at best make educated guesses (e.g.,
Friederici, this issue), as we lack a linking theory between the computational/algorithmic
and the implementational level. It seems to me that a scenario where circuitry capable of re-
cursive computation may have evolved for another purpose (e.g., motor planning or music)
and later was exapted for language seems quite likely. What is your current take on these
questions?
It is often claimed that recursive computation is involved in motor planning, but
that seems to me a misunderstanding of both recursive computation and motor
planning. Recursive computation holds for systems of digital infinity. Motor plan-
ning is not a system of digital infinity (though one can impose an arbitrary digital
grid on continuous systems, leaving the issues where they were). And as one looks
beyond this initial (and crucial) distinction, divergences proliferate.
As for music and language, it seems to me far more reasonable to suppose
that music (to the very limited extent that it involves recursive computation) was
exapted from language than the converse. Or, perhaps, as suggested by Jeffrey Wa-
tumull and Marc Hauser in recent work (Hauser & Watumull 2016), that recursive
computation emerged and was applied in cognitive systems of digital infinity, lan-
guage and arithmetic, maybe music.
What about labels, respectively Label? You recently argued that Simplest Merge in contrast
to the original definition of Merge cannot yield labelled objects by conceptual necessity, and
continued by speculating that labels may not exist as syntactic objects. Could you elaborate
on this? And what about endocentricity, respectively headedness as a key property of hu-
man language, after all, at the heart of X-bar theory?
This takes us off into different and more technical directions, not appropriate in
this context, I think.
Well, some colleagues have asked me to pose some questions to you. One of them wanted me
to ask you why you are so convinced that sensorimotor systems only play an ancillary role
in language, that is, especially when taking a processing perspective? On the computational
level this view is, of course, very plausible; but when we look at implementation she is not
so sure. Think embodied cognition. Also, she thinks that in the context of the MP these an-
cillary systems are thought to do a lot more work at the interfaces than previously assumed?
I’ve explained the reasons elsewhere, both conceptual and empirical (for review
of some of them, see What Kind of Creatures are We?; Chomsky 2016). They seem
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to me sound and compelling. In processing, sensorimotor systems play a central
role, by definition. I don’t understand the rest. “More work” than what? “Than
previously assumed” when? Implementation of what? I don’t see what else is at
stake.
Okay. Next, another colleague wanted me to ask you about your take on the origin of lexical
elements which, incidentally, do a lot of the work in current syntactic theory. Lenneberg al-
ready put forward an approach to lexical semantics that was non-referential and completely
intensional, the importance of which you have repeatedly emphasised. In Why Only Us?
(Berwick & Chomsky 2016), lexical elements were almost completely put aside. Interest-
ingly, Lenneberg seems to have thought that the way in which humans categorise is not
qualitatively different from other animals. Also, he considered “words” not as labels for
concepts stored in memory but as labels for categorisation processes. What is your current
outlook on these questions? Will the evolutionary origin of “words” remain mysterious or
eventually turn out to be susceptible to study?
I think there is very strong evidence, which I’ve discussed elsewhere, that human
concepts/lexical semantics are radically distinct from anything known elsewhere
in the animal world. Their evolutionary origin is a mystery, which is why they
were “put aside” in our discussion of the evolution of the faculty of language. For
the moment, there are, to my knowledge, no useful ideas as to how to investigate
this mystery.
Lastly, if I am not mistaken, you started out at MIT as part of a machine translation project
that you ended up never really working on because you thought it quite pointless—is that
correct? A colleague of mine is interested in translation and, while not at all related to the
topic of this special issue, he wanted me to also ask you about how you think one might
approach the study of translation within a framework such as that of generative grammar?
Is there something like a “translation faculty?” Personally, I might add that this question
probably touches upon how we conceive of and understand the mapping to the semantic-
pragmatic interface and the degree of variation that this mapping permits as opposed to the
mapping to sensorimotor systems?
I happened to be appointed in a machine translation research project, but never
worked on the topic. My feeling from the start was that for practical purposes, brute
force approaches would be the most feasible. While some day understanding of
language might contribute materially to this project, that time was still remote. And
research on machine translation did not seem to me the way to advance the project
of understanding the nature of language. These expectations have been borne out,
as far as I know. I don’t know of any reason to suppose that there is a “trans-
lation faculty”. The question of variation at the semantic-pragmatic/conceptual-
intentional interface is an interesting one, at the border of research (my own guess
is: not much). But understanding is far from contributing much to improving au-
tomatic translation.
Final question. While this interview was intended as a discussion of your scientific work,
I would nevertheless like to also include this somewhat more personal question, if that is
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appropriate?—Obviously, you have not slowed down a bit despite officially retiring from
MIT years ago. And rumour has it that you will soon be moving to the University of Ari-
zona? So, after all these years in science and an arguably heretofore unprecedented academic
career, please tell us, what keeps you going?
Yes, moving to the University of Arizona. What keeps me going is the excitement
of learning and discovery. The fields that have always interested me are, I think,
opening up new vistas that offer much hope of deeper understanding of the nature
of language and mind.
Professor Chomsky, thank you very much for answering my questions.
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